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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court decision in Faretta v.
California! established legal self-representation as a constitutionally
guaranteed right in both state and federal cases. Since the 1975
decision, concern has grown over the impact of pro se litigants on
the legal system. This article focuses on one aspect of the pro se
problem: the ways in which law libraries and law librarians can
help pro se litigants who become law library patrons to achieve
effective self-representation. After surveying the extent and nature
of pro se use of law libraries, the article assesses the ways in which
law librarians should respond to the needs of pro se patrons and
the legal and ethical implications of the librarians' conduct. Con
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University; on leave from
Western New England College School of Law, 1977-78.
** Law Librarian and Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College
School of Law.
t The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Ms. Susan
Hedges Patton, class of 1979, Wayne State University Law School and Mr. Joseph
Doyle, class of 1979, Western New England College School of Law.
1. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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crete institutional responses will be suggested to the problem
posed by Faretta: How to achieve fairness in litigation when one
party is not represented by counsel.

II.
A.

LAW LIBRARIES AND PRO

SE PATRONS

The Magnitude of Pro Se Use and the Traditional
Law Library Response

The extent to which pro se patrons make use of law libraries is
difficult to assess. 2 Although no systematic study has been undertak
en, data indicate that many law libraries receive requests for assis
tance from pro se patrons. 3 Evidence of pro se library use is also
available from the unsystematic impressions of law librarians who
have occasionally reduced these impressions to writing. 4 Study of
these sources allows one to conclude that pro se patronage, espe
cially in urban areas,5 constitutes significant library use. These pa
trons are either welcomed or permitted at a vast majority of law
libraries 6 and form a noticeable fraction of the user population.
Measurements of the magnitude of pro se patronage must take
into account the nature of library services required as well as the
actual number of users. With few exceptions, pro se patrons have
not received training in legal research. 7 As a result, their requests
for librarian assistance are more frequent and are likely to be more
time consuming than those. of other patrons. 8 With virtually no
data available detailing the nature of pro se requests, one can only
2. A pro se patron for the purposes of this discussion includes any library pa
tron, not at the time represented by counsel, who seeks information about a personal
legal problem.
3. See Werner, Law Library Service to Prisoners-The Responsibility of Non
prison Libraries, 63 LAW LIB. J. 231, 236-37 (1970), and Allen, Whom Shall We
Serve: Secondary Patrons of the University Law School Library, 66 LAW LIB. J. 160
( 1973).
4. See, e.g., Begg, The Reference Librarian and the Pro Se Patron, 69 LAW LIB.
J. 26 (1976). One should note that these reports may frequently be understated, for
only a pro se patron who actively communicates that status to the librarian will be
noticed.
5. See Allen, supra note 3, at 160-61.
6. ld. at 165. Private libraries are the exception to the general practice of per
mitting pro se patronage.
7. In the prison library context, many inmates develop significant legal research
skills. Cj. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (a state may not prohibit prisoners
from providing legal assistance to other prisoners in the absence of other alterna
tives).
8. One often detects a sense of librarian hostility to. such demands on library
services. See Begg, supra note 4, at 30-32.
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evaluate the potential costs involved in providing the requested as
sistance. Recent figures indicate that law libraries spend roughly 55
per cent of their overall budgets on personnel costs. 9 Since the
only other major variable items in most library budgets are serials
and new acquisitions, the trade-offs can become quite dramatic.
The time spent in aiding pro se patrons must either directly reduce
the time available to serve others or possibly result in reduced ac
quisitions. 1o The need for the assistance of highly trained, non
clerical law library personnel further exacerbates the demands that
pro se patronage places on strained library resources. In view of
these costs, it is not surprising that only a fraction of the requests
for help that librarians receive from pro se patrons are fulfilled. 11
The qualitative nature of the services requested by the pro se
patron bears on the issue of the appropriate law library response.
Often, these requests extend beyond the mere procurement of
physical materials to assistance with legal analysis and argument.
Law libraries have heretofore avoided the burdens of providing
analytical services. 12 This institutional decision is formally acknowl
edged in the American Association of Law Libraries Draft Code of
Professional Responsibility and Ethics which states that:
Law Librarians should refrain from unauthorized practice of law.
This should be understood as: not to give legal advice or opin
ion, or interpretation of statutes or court decisions. On the other
hand, if requested both the text of the law and the court in
terpretation of it, either in statutes or codes, or the decisions of
the courts should be made available for everyone. 13

9. P. SWORDS & F. WALWER, THE COSTS AND RESOURCES OF LEGAL EDUCA
TION 218 (1974).
10. It is assumed that there is not idle patron service capacity. One should
further note that to employ an additional staff member may involve a quantum leap
in expense. See Allen, supra note 3, at 168, where he states:
[E]very single bit of service extended to secondary patrons (to the bar, to stu
dents from other law schools, to taxpayers, etc.) is purchased at the expense
of service to the primary patrons of the library, and that the law school stu
dent and faculty member at the host institution is the loser.
11. See Werner, supra note 3, at 237; Allen, supra note 3, at 170-71.
12. See text accompanying notes 13-40 infra.
13. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES DRAFT CODE OF ETHICS, art.
III, § 2 (1974), [hereinafter cited as DRAFT CODE]. This draft code was voted upon
at the 1975 Annual Convention of the American Association of Law Libraries. The
draft, however, did not receive a majority endorsement and was withdrawn by the
Ethics Committee for further re-working. A re-draft is to be ready in time for discus
sion and vote at the Annual Convention scheduled for late June, 1978. Some type of
statement on unautho~ized practice is expected to appear in this new draft.
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Taken at face value, the Draft Code provides the basis upon
which law libraries may seek to respond when the services re
quested by the pro se patron require legal analysis. Even before
the promulgation of the Draft Code, many individual law libraries,
fearing liability for unauthorized practice of law, had made policy
decisions not to provide analytical assistance in most cases. These
policies were drawn with explicit recognition that "[l]aw library em
ployes [sic] are cloaked with knowledge, and unsuspecting inquirers
will believe what they tell them. Thus, there is a serious obligation
to guide employees on how to react in various situations, and to em
phasize the importance of weighing their actions carefully. "14
One cannot realistically presume, however, that the underly
ing problems are solved by the mere drafting of codes or policies.
Initially, a line drawing problem appears. When should technical
assistance in locating materials be denied so that the librarian need
not fear slipping into the realm of analysis?15 Before attempting to
define this line, one must first examine the premises underlying
the Draft Code's ethical position. This is particularly true in light of
the recognition, in Faretta, of the pro se right. 16
B.

Debunking the Perceived Dilemma Regarding Legal
Liability for Analytical Advice

In assisting the unskilled law library user, law librarians fear
that advice which goes beyond the mere provision of materials will
result in legal liability for the unauthorized practice of law. This
deep-seated fear is expressly articulated at two points in the Draft

14. Panel Discussion, Ethical Problems of Law Librarianship, 67 LAW LIB. J.
528, 531 (1974), [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion]. This problem is of modern
origin. A previous authority had said, "The problem of reference or research work in
the law library is less troublesome than might be supposed, for such work is usually
done by the patron himself...." J. KAISER, LAW, LEGISLATIVE AND MUNICIPAL REF
ERENCE LIBRARIES 10 (1914).
15. In the question and answer period following the panel discussion, supra
note 14, the following question was asked by Ms. Elaine Teigler:
The group that most disturbs me is the layman. The phrase in the code,
"The Code and the Decisions should be made available," troubles me with
this group. I ask the question: How do you point out the United States Code,
bring him to it, take the index, and at least, point to his subject and say,
"Now this is the index to the laws now in force in the United States, and be
sure and use the pocket parts," without practising law? I feel if one gives
him the chapter and the verse, you are almost consciously interpreting the
Code.
Panel Discussion, supra note 14, at 538.
16. See text accompanying notes 41-48 infra.
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Code. 17 The perceived dilemma is also prominent in the litera
ture. 1S One graphic account is as follows:
A layman who appears in person to ask a question or who writes
or telephones about one is a problem . . . . While he would
hesitate to ask a medical library staff to diagnose a rash and
fever, he does not hesitate to seek advice from the staff of a law
library when the landlord threatens eviction. Such inquiries
must be handled with tact and assistance in finding the desired
information without actually interpreting the law. A reference
librarian runs the danger of being accused of unlawful practice of
the law or violation of professional ethics. 19

A related fear, though less often expressed, is that liability
may be imposed for negligent rendition of services. 2o Taken to
gether, these fears give rise to the belief that the law librarian who
gives more in-depth assistance than merely providing materials
may be exposed to legal liability.
Although pe~al law and tort law may provide sanctions for eg
regious law librarian misbehavior, it is extremely unlikely that
liability will flow from the types of assistance that are most often
requested and occassionally given. In most cases, the perceived
dilemma simply does not exist. Conduct by the librarian which
exceeds the mere provision of legal materials does not become un
authorized practice of law simply because it includes elements of
analysis of content and probative worth. Similarly, tort liability,
which must be founded on a breach of duty, cannot be imposed
unless the librarian fails to exercise due care. Recognition of these
legal realities does not help answer the normative question of how
much assistance should be provided for the' pro se patron, but it
does allow consideration of the problem without the hindrance of
unfounded fears.
Many cases involving criminal prosecutions for unauthorized
practice contain dicta which define "practice of law" very broadly.
For example, the Georgia Supreme Court has said that practice of
law is "not confined to practice in the courts of this state, but [is]
of [a] larger scope, including . . . the giving of any legal advice,
and any action taken for others in any matter connected with the
17. DRAFT CODE, supra note 13, art. III, § 2; art. VII, § 1.
18. See note 15 supra; cf. Fiordalisi, Law Library Services to the Community,
46 LAW Lis. J. 448, 450-51 (1953) (indicating the need to avoid impinging on the
prerogatives of the organized bar).
19. Heckel, Service to Readers, 11 LIB. TRENDS 271,275-76 (1963).
20. See text accompanying notes 31-37 infra.
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law. "21 Similarly, an earlier Illinois decision involving criminal
prosecution for unauthorized practice, in dicta, found the prac
tice of law to include "the giving of advice or rendering services
requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge."22 Standing alone,
these dicta suggest that many acts undertaken by law librarians
amount to the unauthorized practice of law. By providing the pro
se patron with the relevant statutes and cases, the law librarian has
rendered services requiring some degree of legal skill or know
ledge. The same conduct amounts to action taken for others in a
"matter connected with the law." But the absurdity of defining
those acts as the practice of law is patent. Such services, while
skilled and meaningful, are not the unauthorized practice of law.
Once one recognizes that these dicta sweep far too broadly,
the search for a functional definition of unauthorized practice of law
reveals two major elements. First, the relationship between the
unauthorized practitioner and client usually has a remunerative as
pect. 23 Second, the services rendered involve either preparation of
a physical work product or representation in some sort of transac
tion or forum. 24 Measured against these more concrete functional
tests, it becomes apparent that' significant legal research assistance
does not amount to the unauthorized practice of law. Activities
such as explaining the commands contained in a summons, direct
ing the patron to those rules of court which explain how the sum
mons can be resisted, expressing opinions about the relevance of a
particular source, or simply informing the patron that the position
that he or she is seeking to adopt has been foreclosed by statute or
case law do not involve remuneration, representation, or the prep
aration of a work product. 25 Although they constitute examples of
21. Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 519,162 S.E. 796, 800 (1932) (Ina slightly
atypical case, the state solicitor general sought to enjoin defendants from applying
for authorization to practice law).
22. People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,474, 176 N.E. 901,
907 (1931).
23. See J. FISHER & D. LACHMANN, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK 140
(1972) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
24. [d. at 132; cf. Note, Legal Paraprofessionals and Unauthorized Practice, 8
HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 104, 106-07 (1973) (a discussion of the applicability of unau
thorized practice statutes to legal paraprofessional activities).
25. Those engaged in other professions perform similar functions. For example:
Social workers in public assistance may already be required to practice law
as substantially as if they were in a courtroom. In making an initial determi
nation of an applicant's eligibility, the public assistance worker must com
plete the applicant's financial statement. "Every question, or nearly every
question, on the financial statement, is a legal question. When the social
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librarian conduct beyond the scope of the Draft Code, they do not
constitute unauthorized practice of law. This view is confirmed by
research efforts which failed to find a single reported case in which
a law librarian has been prosecuted for unauthorized practice in the
last thirty years. 26
A more realistic fear is that the librarian who assists pro se
patrons will be invading areas that lawyers regard as their exclusive
domain, even though the assistance provided does not amount to
the practice of law. Consider an encounter with a pro se patron
who begins his use of the law library by relating his legal problem
to the law librarian. Rather than blandly suggesting what materials
are available and describing how they can be used, the librarian
does some preliminary research and gives the patron citations to
relevant statutes and common law precedents as well as the most
recent survey of the topic in the jurisdiction. While reading the
literature provided, the patron poses several questions concerning
legal terminology. These terms are clarified by the librarian; thus
simple legal concepts are indirectly explained. No remuneration is
requested, no document is prepared, no intercession on behalf of
the patron is performed, and no particular course of action is sug
gested. While unauthorized practice of law has not occurred, the li
brarian's conduct has been substituted for legal research services
worker advises, or even discusses the questions or answers, he may very
likely be giving legal advice." The private social worker who advises an ap
plicant that he should apply, how to apply, what to answer and how to ap
peal if the application is rejected is also giving "legal" advice. When he
argues ... on behalf of the applicant, he is giving representation. When and
if he goes to a hearing on behalf of the applicant, he is surely engaging in
advocacy.
Sparer, Thorkelson, & Weiss, The Lay Advocate, 43 U. DET. L.J. 493,499-500 (1966)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Downs, Providing the Social Worker with Legal Under
standing: Specific Need, HEW CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, THE EXTENSION OF
LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR 141 (1964».
26. See HANDBOOK, supra note 23. No cases were found in which there was
any indication that the basis for the charges related to activities of a law librarian.
See also Letter from Professor J. Myron Jacobstein to the authors (December 19,
1977) (on file with Western New England Law Review). Professor Jacobstein, of Stan
ford Law School, confirms the position of the authors on the basis of his own inde
pendent research. Additional research techniques were employed which would not
necessarily identify cases in which the charged individual was coincidentally a law
librarian. No effort was made to extend the additional search beyond the most recent
thirty years. It should be noted that legal research firms or paralegals now regularly
do major research and analytical work. These firms and paralegals are employed by
attorneys who in turn bill the expense (and then some) to clients. See generally
Bailey, Kleeman, & Ring, Paralegal Functions and Legal Constraints, 9 CLEARING
HOUSE REV. 851 (1976).
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traditionally performed by attorneys. Although these services are
usually rendered in conjunction with providing advice, they do
provide a segment of attorney income. Because law librarians view
maintenance of good working relations with the bar as essential,
they are inclined to avoid such potential conflicts with attorney
services.
Attorneys are easily the most important patron class 27 and can
strongly influence the tone of the working environment in the law
library. More fundamentally, a significant number of law libraries
are sponsored or funded by the organized bar. 28 In those libraries,
job security might well be linked to a policy of noninterference
with attorney prerogatives. To the argument that once an indi
vidual has elected to proceed pro se no attorney is deprived of a
client, the bar can respond that, if left unaided, the pro se patron
might quickly recognize the need for counsel. Similarly, the avail
, ability of Significant law librarian aid may influence the original deci
sion whether or not to proceed pro se. 29
On balance, a pragmatic view counsels law librarians to avoid
providing services to pro se patrons which significantly overlap
those areas of assistance which frequently generate counsel fees.
Although in most cases this means that the librarian should not
supervise or direct the whole course of research to be undertaken,
it does not rule out qualitative, analytical, or even interpretive ad
vice. A librarian does not overstep externally erected30 professional
barriers by narrowing or redirecting research efforts, expressing
views about the weight to be given to various authorities, or engag
ing in similar activities.
Fear of tort liability is advanced as the second major reason to
limit assistance to patrons. Proceeding from a premise of "safety
first," one may assume that the law librarian should give no ser
vices except those involved in keeping the collection up-to-date,
the doors open, the floors nonslippery, and the reading room free
27. See Allen, supra note 3, at 164.
28. See generally, McGuirl, Summary of the Survey of Law Libraries Serving a
Local Bar, 65 LAW LIB. J. 244 (1972).
29. This is very speculative. It is doubtful that most potential consumers of
legal services would be at all aware of the practices of law libraries. Compare with
text accompanying notes 79-81 infra, and materials cited therein.
30. Internally imposed barriers may exist. The purpose of the present discus
sion is to explain that the existing barriers to expanded service to pro se patrons are
those which law librarians impose upon themselves. Consequently, the barriers
should be independently justified without reference to external pressures such as the
fear of legal sanctions..
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of pneumonia-inducing drafts. Tort law imposes liability for breach
of duty; if no duty is owed, none can be breached. The law librar
ian owes duties regarding the maintenance of the collection, such
as proper filing of looseleaf supplements, or warnings when s~ch
supple~entation is incomplete. In addition, the law librarian's
duties of due care31 extend to the performance of all general library
functions. 32 No legal duty is owed to assist the pro se patron. Thus,
if no services are extended to such patrons beyond the traditional
bibliographic ones set forth in Draft Code of Ethics, no tort liability
can follow. 33
Of course, if one does choose to act when there is no duty to
do so, one must use due care. 34 The law librarian who attempts to
aid the pro se patron must be reasonably careful, clear, and
thorough. While all assistance given by law librarians theoretically
involves some risk of tort liability if not done with due care, that
risk of liability may be significantly greater dealing with pro se pa
trons than dealing with legally sophisticated patrons. What the law
librarians perceive as a likelihood of pro se patron reliance 35 trans
31. Tort law has long debated whether duties of due care are owed generally,
or whether they are only owed to those who might be foreseeably injured by the
conduct involved. Compare, Chief Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Is
land RR, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), with the dissenting opinion of Justice
Andrews, id. at 347, 162 N.E. at 101. The distinction is 'unimportant for purposes of
the present discussion as the entire patron population is forseeably within the zone
of danger created by negligent law Iibrarianship.
32. There are also some foreseeable special functions which are to be per
formed by the law librarian. The reference interview of a patron may involve learn
ing details of the patron's private life. See DRAFT CODE, supra note 13, art. III, § 4.
In this regard, improper disclosure by the law librarian of the confidential material
might result in tort liability. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 802-18
(4th ed. 1971).
33. Tort liability of law librarians is as unlikely as liability for unauthorized
. practice. See notes 19-24 supra and accompanying text. The only reported tort Iitiga"
tion involved a claim by a patron of a public law library who attacked its limited
hours of operation as a civil rights violation. Wright v. Lane County Comm'rs, 459
F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1972). See also, Panel Discussion, An Ethical Code for Law
Librarianship?, 62 LAW LIB. J. 409, 417 (1969), which contains a fleeting reference
to the possible purchases of reference librarian malpractice insurance; Angoff, Li
brary Malpractice Suit, Could It Happen to You?, 7 AM. LIB. 489 (1976) (hypotheti
cal example); cf. Wade, Tort Liability of Paralegals and Lawyers Who Utilize Their
Services, 24 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1150 (1971) (potential liability of paralegals and the
attorneys who employ them is "well defined," "controllable" and justified by the ben
efits to the legal profession and the public). For a discussion of due care'in legal
research by attorneys, see Toward a Standard of Care in Legal Research, 2 GLEN
DALE L. REV. 63 (1977).
34. See generally 57 AM. JUR. 2d Negligence §§ 45, 74 (1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
35. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
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lates into an element of the tort inquiry.36 The foreseeable reliance
of the pro se patron upon law librarian advice opens the door to
liability if poor advice results in loss of the pro se litigation which
otherwise would have succeeded. In contrast, giving bad research
advice to attorneys or others trained in legal research and legal
principles is far less likely to bear a requisite link to any sub
sequent injury for the imposition of tort liability.37
The obvious and basic principle that should guide librarian ac
tion is the attentive exercise of due care in giving advice to pro se
patrons regardless of the kind or amount of advice given. The more
important precept is that librarians must recognize the limits of
their skill and training. Not all law librarians possess law degrees 38
and not all law library staff are trained legal researchers.39 For
those who lack the expertise needed to provide even basic legal
research assistance, the realistic fear of tort liability is a significant
internal barrier to automatically giving broader aid to all pro se
patrons. It does not follow, however, that such aid is to be refused
in all or even most cases by the increasing number of law librarians
who do possess significant legal skills. 40 In view of the social need
for fairness in the administration of justice, a need which our sys
tem has heretofore addressed by attempting to secure access to
competent legal counsel for all parties, those law librarians must
consider on a clean slate the nature and type of aid to be given.
While librarians should exercise due care, they should also stand
ready to provide meaningful aid to pro se patrons.

III.
A.

THE ADEQUACY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION

The Societal Considerations

In Faretta,41 the right to proceed pro se received full judicial
recognition for the first time. Prior to that decision, the unqualified
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, comment C (l965); See
also Wade, supra note 33, at 1135.
37. One notable exception may arise from the library practice of providing
telephone reference service for attorneys or others. If, in responding to an attorney's
request regarding the appropriate limitations period to be applied in a specific cause
of action, a mere misstatement of the applicable statute is made, the misinformation
might provide a basis for librarian liability.
38. See Price & Kitchen, Degree-Oriented Study Among Law Librarians, 64
LAW LIB. J. 29 (1971).
39. Id. at 30-32.
40. Id. at 29.
41. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

1978]

RESPONSE TO THE PRO SE PATRON

57

right to self-representation had been criticized as a source of un
fairness in our judicial system. For example, Professor Grano, re
ferring to pro se representation in criminal cases, urged that:
A strong and just government must supervise and restrict its
own behavior to assure its continued strength and popular sup
port, which depend, to some extent, on protecting the security
of the rest of the members of the community. This security is
maintained only if the community is convinced that the govern
ment will not deprive anyone of his rights except by methods
objectively fair. Therefore, the government must have the right
to demand that it not deviate from certain standards, even if the
individual proceeded against would see no transgression. 42

On the other side, the Supreme Court, in dicta, favored the cause
of the would be pro se litigant on a number of occasions. 43 Despite
these differences, all involved in the debate have always recognized
that the government has a strong interest in achieving fairness in
the administration of both criminal and civil justice. To the extent
that pro se representation is less effective than representation by
counsel, fairness is jeopardized. After the Faretta decision, the
societal interest in fairness must either be ignored or protected by
means other than the forced representation by counsel.
Effective assistance of counsel is a fundamental means by
which American jurisprudence has traditionally protected the ob
jective fairness of the criminal system. Commentators have often
observed that adequate legal representation is a prerequisite to en
joyment of constitutional protections. 44 Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has deemed legal representation a fundamental
right, requiring that assistance of counsel be available in all felony45

42. See Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process,
54 MINN. L. REV. 1175 (1970):
In the modern era it is not always fully understood that the adversary system
performs a vital social function and is the product of long historical experi
ence. The state trials in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England dem
onstrated that a system of justice that provides inadequate opportunities to
challenge official decisions is not only productive of injuries to individuals,
but is itself a threat to the state's security and to the larger interests of the
community.
Id. at 1196 n.114 (quoting REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 10 (1963».
43. See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rei. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80
(1942) (dicta recognizing the "right to dispense with a lawyer's help").
44. See generally Kamisar, The Right to Counsel, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962).
45. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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and misdemeanor cases. 46 Moreover, as the scope of collateral re
view of convictions in criminal cases is in a period of rapid contrac
tion,47 rigorous compliance with technical and procedural require
ments is necessary to fully protect a defendant's constitutional
rights. Viewed in this light, "Faretta presents the possibility of a
pro se representation shockingly inferior to what may be expected
of the prosecution. "48
.
Although civil cases also rely on adversary presentation, the
societal interest in insuring the relative equality of legal representa
tion is not as strong. Unlike a criminal prosecution, the govern
ment is not the prime mover of the civil process; hence, there is
less fear of institutional unfairness. The rights which may· be
eclipsed by poor representation and adverse judgments are, at least
theoretically, not as significant as a deprivation of liberty. Despite
these differences, it is important that all citizens have a fundamen
tal right of access to civil courts which are procedurally fair. The
appropriate use of those courts should be encouraged by a reputa
tion for doing justice. In addition, judicial efficiency is furthered by
the proficient preparation and presentation of civil cases by those
trained in the law and rules of procedure. Therefore, in civil dis
putes as well as criminal cases, courts have traditionally relied on
the skill and knowledge of lawyers to make the system work effi
ciently and fairly.

B.

Toward a Concept of Minimally Adequate Legal
Representation

The immediately preceding discussion summarized the soci
etal interest in adequate representatipn which is endangered by the
creation in F aretta of an absolute right to proceed pro se. 49 From
the perspective of the accused who is handling his or her own case,
46. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
47. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S.
233 (1973). For an excellent discussion of these cases, see Cover & Aleinikoff, Dia
lectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1072-77, 1100
02 (1977).
48. Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 86
YALE L.J. 292, 293 (1976) [hereinafter cited as YALE Note].
49. But cf. Robbins & Herman, Pro Se Litigation, Litigating Without Counsel:
Faretta or For Worse, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 629, 631 (1976) (post conviction crimi
nal defendants and civil litigants are not constitutionally entitled to free counsel;
Faretta, however, should not be interpreted to prohibit the court from appointing
counsel to such litigants when they request assistance).
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society's responsibility is to provide conditions under which pro se
representation will be constitutionally adequate. Just as access to
transcripts became a part of adequate representation, 50 it seems
clear that access to other types of materials may be essential to
minimally adequate self-representation. 51
.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Faretta recog
nized that inadequate pro se representation may frequently oc
cur. 52 In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger contended that the
paramount constitutional right to be protected is the right of the
"fullest possible defense. "53 The majority reasoned that "assistance"
in preparing a defense is the essence of due process and that un
wanted counsel is not assistance. 54 At a minimum, both positions
include the concept that the Constitution commands that some
assistance be available to criminal defendants. 55 Since counsel can
no longer be imposed on an unwilling party, possible alternative
sources of this constitutionally mandated assistance. must be ex
amined.
Another recent decision of the United States Supreme Court,
Bounds v. Smith, 56 provides a starting point from which to analyze
the problem. In that case, state prison inmates successfully main
tained a federal civil rights action under section 1983,57 claiming that
their constitutional right of access to the courts was denied by the
state's failure to provide adequate prison law libraries. Proceeding
from a premise that "[i]t is now established beyond doubt that

50. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
51. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
52. The facts in Faretta indicate that the trial judge refused to allow Faretta to
proceed pro se because he lacked the knowledge and skill necessary to achieve even
arguably effective self-representation. 422 U.S. at 808 n.3.
53. 422 U.S. at 840.
54. ld. at 832-33.
55. Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding that a state is not required
by due process to provide free counsel for indigent criminal defendants seeking dis
cretionary appeals). The arguments advanced in this section will address pro se crim
inal litigation. It is acknowledged that there is no analogous constitutional under
pinning for similar arguments in civil cases. For a discussion of the civil litigant's
interests see text accompanying notes 41-48 supra.
56. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts, "58 the
majority noted that prior Supreme Court decisions had "required
remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the courts is
adequate, effective and meaningful. "59 The Court affirmed the rul
ing below which required establishment of "adequate law libraries
or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. "60 The
analogy between meaningful inmate access to legal materials and
the minimal level of assistance to be given pro se litigants, while
imperfect, is still fruitful. The due process concern in Bounds v.
Smith clearly suggests that a post-Faretta decision to forego the aid
of counsel should not be interpreted as a waiver of all claims to
effective participation in the litigation process. 61 To find that a
non incarcerated pro se defendant has a lesser right of access to
legal reference materials than a person who has already suffered
conviction and incarceration would be anomalous.
Several concrete steps have been taken which attempt to give
substance to the access concept central to Bounds v. Smith. Even
before that decision, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Avery 62 had
struck down a prison regulation that prohibited inmates from assist
ing one another with legal matters. The Johnson opinion was based
on the recognition that many inmates were "unable themselves,
with reasonable adequacy, to prepare their petitions."63 More re
cently, the American Association of Law Libraries published a
manual designed to help train prison library workers to give legal
research assistance to inmates. This manual states that prison law
librarians "can help inmates find the material they need and when
necessary, show them how the books are used."64 Most recently, in
Bounds v. Smith, the Court cited with favor the provision of "profes
sional or quasi-professional legal assistance to prisoners. "65 Taken
58. 430 U.S. at 821. Cj. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (declaring invalid
a Tennessee state prison regulation forbidding prisoners to assist one another in pre
paring writs).
59. 430 U.S. at 823.
60. Id. at 828 (footnote omitted).
61. Cj. YALE Note, supra note 48 at 307-08 (proposing a "standby counsel" be
appointed for jailed pro se defendants who otherwise have little opportunity to prepare
a defense).
62. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
63. Id. at 489 (emphasis supplied). But cf. Hackin v. Arizona, 102 Ariz. 218,
220, 427 P.2d 910, 911-12, appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 143 (1967) (although a prisoner
may need the help of others to prepare a writ of habeas corpus, "[tlhe matter is then
in the hands of the court which is well acquainted with the law, and whose duty it is
to determine the legality of the petitioner's detention").
64. O. WERNER, MANUAL FOR PRISON LAW LIBRARIES 1 (1976).
65. 430 U.S. at 830. See text accompanying notes 20-21 & 33 supra.
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as a whole, these precedents and institutional developments signal
a strong concern that legal self-representation should not be ren
dered ineffective by the pro se litigant's individual lack of knowl
edge or expertise.
C.

Alternatives to the Effective Assistance of Counsel

There are many ways to help pro se litigants prepare and pre
sent their cases effectively. Primary among these are various forms
of nonrepresentational assistance of counsel and differing types of
paralegal services. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Faretta, took
the position that unwanted counsel is more effective than no coun
sel at all. 66 Even in a noncooperative setting, counsel can guaran
tee that the judicial system take cognizance of the party's legal
rights. Briefs can be filed, the admissibility of evidence can be
challenged, and inadvertent waivers of legal rights by procedural
default can be avoided. 67 One commentator, expanding on these
suggestions, has urged the appointment of "standby counsel" whose
role would be determined in accord with the wishes of the pro se
defendant, especially the jailed pro se defendant: "[T]he defendant
may request that standby counsel transmit to the court requests for
investigative, expert, and other services, that he take part in the
plea-bargaining process, or that he participate in pretrial hear
ings. "68 Another commentator has developed a comprehensive
model of "hybrid representation" which includes the required ap
pointment of counsel and encouragement to the pro se defendant
to "make active use of counsel [while preserving] his [the litigant's]
dignity and freedom of choice. . . . "69 This type of model has re
ceived at least some judicial support7° and arguably strikes a satis
fYing balance between the policies implicit in the right to counsel
cases 71 and those underlying Faretta. Especially important is the

66. 422 U.s. at 846 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
67. Cj. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 47 (waivers of legal rights by default as
a result of attorney error may unfairly penalize defendants who are powerless to
prevent or to defend against such failures).
68. YALE Note, supra note 48, at 308 (footnotes omitted).
69. Note, Assistance of Counsel: A Right to Hybrid Representation, 57 B. U. L.
REV. 370, 584 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hybrid Note].
70. Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 976, aff'd on rehearing, 437 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Grow,
394 F.2d 182 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); Bayless v. United States,
381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967).
71. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
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claimed ability of hybrid representation to protect the orderliness
of the trial process and the impartial role of the trial judge. 72
Any of the above plans can provide some legal assistance to
the pro se litigant and thereby help to protect the interest of soci
ety in insuring at least minimally adequate representation. Yet
neither these plans nor the systematic assistance of paralegal aid
are widely available to pro se criminal defendants. In addition, sys
tematic legal assistance is usually associated only with criminal
cases. As noted before, society has a vital interest in fair and effi
cient civil litigation. Consequently, there is an institutional void;
some criminal pro se litigants and virtually all civil pro se litigants
receive no legal assistance at all. Law libraries and law librarians
can help fill the void.
Although no reliable statistics are available, it is reasonable to
assume that most pro se litigants will seek out a source of legal
information and thus be referred to a library containing a signifi
cant collection of legal materials. 73 Previous writers on pro se li
brary patrons have assumed that the pro se user is likely to solicit
the aid of the library staff. 74 Further, since many law libraries are
restricted access libraries, patron identification and reference inter
view procedures can alert the librarian to pro se library use. In this
manner, a prerequisite for institutional response to the pro se liti
gant is met: the party in need of assistance has been identified to
the party able to provide assistance.
Apart from being well situated to identify those in need of
their assistance, law librarians are generally well equipped to pro
vide specialized services. Virtually all law librarians are college edu
cated, most have at least one advanced degree, and a growing num
ber have law degrees. 75 More important, virtually all law librarians
have experience in legal bibliography and research techniques. In
many university settings, they are given responsibility for providing
students with legal research instruction. The exercise of biblio
graphic and research skills on behalf of the pro se patron, while not
a panacea, is a vital step beyond the bland provision of materials
envisioned by the Draft Code and beyond the constraints imposed

72. _ See Hybrid Note, supra note 69, at 584.
73. The obvious exception is the inmate population prior to the widespread
implementation of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
.
74. See Begg, supra note 4, at 26-27.
75. See Price & Kitchen, supra note 38, at 29. For an interesting historical
sidelight see W. ROALFE, LIBRARIES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1953).
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by unfounded fears of legal liability. 76
Librarians' bibliographic skills can be utilized to the advantage
of the pro se patron by providing compilations of materials in the
collection which bear on a particular genre of problems. These
compilations may include annotations which indicate the techniques
by which materials can be used to maximum advantage, or those
which explain how kindred material is located. Although it is un
realistic to expect an uninitiated pro se patron to resort to
Shepard's Citations to insure the continued vitality of precedents,
it is quite realistic to suggest that law librarians can easily make
this knowledge available. Similarly, indicating to a pro se patron
the relative value as a research tool of annotated collections of stat
utes, as opposed to mere compilations of laws, is simple and yet
invaluable. Finally, a law librarian can explain the role of legislative
history in statutory interpretation to the pro se patron or tell the
patron that there are other code sections relevant to solution of the
particular problem.
These few examples were deliberately chosen for their want of
sophistication. Once law librarians agree that such reference ser
vices are to be provided, they must decide where to draw the line.
As the reference inquiry becomes more clearly focused, the distinc
tion between search and solution, between provision of materials
and substantive legal analysis, blurs. 77 Relieved of the unjustified
fear that detailed reference help amounts to the unauthorized
practice of law, the librarian should feel free to give as much aid as
individual conscience and expertise dictate. Such a response con
trasts markedly with the traditional law librarian solution which
stopped well short of detailed aid, limiting service to provision of
basic materials. 78
76. Cf. Ginger & Macleod, The Rights of the People and the Role of Librar
ians, 19 LIB. TRENDS 96 (1970) (Public, academic, and law librarians "can perform a
valuable service for both their patrons and the democracy of our country by recogniz
ing the importance of the people's need to know their rights, and by providing them
with the necessary materials and information").
77. See note 15 supra.
78. "The advice given in some library schools and in the past (lead the patron
with a legal problem to the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, then walk away fast
before he can ask you for more help) is inadequate for today's society." Ginger &
Macleod, supra note 76, at 96. At a recent conference designed to familiarize public
and academic librarians with legal materials, the traditional solution was echoed. In
response to the question "[aJre there any problems when a librarian answers legal
questions?" one of the conference speakers answered "[d]on't give legal advice that
could be dangerous. Just point them toward the tools." Norton, LEX: Law Advice for
Public & Academic Librarians, 103 LIB. J. 313, 314 (1978).
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One obvious drawback to a highly individualized response to
the legal research needs of the pro se patron is time and expense.
Service to pro se patrons can significantly interfere with service to
attorneys, whom the law library defines as its primary clientele.
Such responses, moreover, are no substitute for a broader institu
tional solution. Since law libraries are not equally equipped to pro
vide legal research expertise, the burden of such services will fall
dispropmtionately on those libraries located in population centers
where pro se representation is more frequene 9 or on those li
braries which hold themselves outs° or come to be known for the
research assistance provided. 81 To insure that most pro se patrons
will receive meaningful assistance, more general solutions must be
devised.
At a preliminary level, materials should be prepared which in
troduce the inexperienced legal researcher to the law library. For
. example, a videotape or audio-cassette tour of the law library, de
scribing the location and use of fundamental segments of the collec
tion, could be produced. Alternatively, or in addition, walking
tours of the library can be publicized and provided at times found
to be convenient to pro se litigants. Similar materials or presenta
tions can be made available which delineate basic research tech
niques and search methodology. These programs would be econom
ical: patrons would be introduced to the library and informed of
the location of materials without the use of individualized librarian
assistance.
At the next level, a law library can solicit outside assistance to
expand its force of legally trained personnel willing to aid pro se
litigants. The law librarian can ask the local bar association to pro
vide volunteers to conduct seminars on substantive topics of recur
ring concern such as landlord-tenant law, effective use of small
claims court, and the basics of local court procedure. Similarly, the
organized bar and area law schools may be asked to provide volun
teers to assist individual pro se patrons in legal research. Although
these steps cannot guarantee adequate pro se representation in
every case, they are fundamental. They would represent an institu
79. Allen, supra note 3, at 160-61.
80. Cf. Ginger & Macleod, supra note 76, at 102 (Legal collections for layper
sons should be publicized through newsletters, newspaper articles, exhibits, bibliog
raphies, and lectures; "The right to justice must be advertised ... if there is to be
justice in the land").
81. But cf. Begg, supra note 4, at 31 (ways to discourage requests for research
assistance and minimize the problems presented by the pro se patron),
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tional recognition of the need to serve a larger constituency. By
taking the initiative, law libraries can tacitly acknowledge a new
role for themselves in the post-Faretta era. 82
An enlarged institutional response could encourage a corre
spondingly enlarged assumption of responsibility by librarians and
staff members for giving the pro se patron extensive individual aid.
One can imagine a law librarian delving deeply into the details of a
problem and guiding the research to an informed conclusion. Such
a course of action, however, in addition to being extremely bur
densome on library personnel and jeopardizing service to attor
neys, may raise the problem of discrimination among patrons.
Although the potential for legal liability is not a constraint to pro
viding individual assistance,83 either temperament or conscience
may be.
The Draft Code's tacit suggestion that there should be no dis
crimination in the services rendered to various patrons 84 is un
realistic when close working relationships are involved. A law librar
ian cannot respond with the same verve to all detailed requests for
assistance. When providing access to library materials the librarian
can treat all patrons equally with relative ease; but when the assis
tance requested involves close oversight of the research, personal
interaction becomes important. In the same way that an attorney
may refuse to become counsel for a party,85 the law librarian's in
dividual prerogatives to refuse analytical assistance to a patron must
be respected.
Accepting this limitation on the librarian's obligation to aid
pro se patrons and recalling the constraint that advice must not be
given beyond the scope of expertise,86 it becomes apparent that
the assistance given to individual pro se patrons will vary widely
from law library to law library and from patron to patron. This
potential lack of uniformity is a serious problem which is only par
tially ameliorated by the institutional responses already advocated.
Although the concern of law librarians has focused on the unequal
burden on law libraries resulting from varied amounts of available

82. For a statement from which the "old" role may be inferred, see Begg, supra
note 4, at 31: "There are several ways to minimize the problems presented by the
pro se patron.... By far the most effective method for eliminating such problems is
to exclude these patrons from the library."
83.. See text accompanying notes 18-40 supra.
84. See DRAFT CODE, supra note 13, art. III, § 1; art. VII, §§ 2(a) & 2(b) & 4.
85. A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No.2.
86. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
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aid,87 a more troublesome problem is the impact of this nonunifor
mity on pr~ se patrons. Since these potential law library users are
in part defined by their general lack of legal sophistication, they
should not be forced to ascertain and evaluate the policies and
quality of assistance which may be found at various libraries. 88
At least two solutions to the problem of nonuniformity exist.
First, library policies and resources can be publicized to facilitate
comparison. Second, a uniform library response to pro se patrons
can be required. The latter is the approach advocated, at least in
part, by the Draft Code. 89 As a long tenn solution, this approach is
preferable provided it includes express recognition of the compel
ling need for meaningful pro se law library access 90 and simultane
ously requires sufficiently high standards of competency and train
ing for law librarians. 91 In the interim, law libraries can easily
make known their policies regarding pro se patronage and provide
the introductory materials on legal research as previously advo
cated.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Faretta v. California indirectly forced a redefinition of our
concept of adequate legal representation. Litigants who choose to
exercise their pro se right have not forfeited all claims to adequate
, representation. Although providing pro se patrons with the assis
tance they need is a task that several sectors of the legal commu
nity must undertake, law librarians and law libraries must become
more involved. They are particularly well situated and fairly well
suited to deliver essential help to pro se litigants in the short run.
87. Even if nonuniform response resulted in different levels of pro se patron
age, the affected libraries could simply reduce the level of service if the burden was
too great. User fees might be charged of all pro se patrons to help defray expense.
This solution, however, creates a climate in which the previous fears of unauthorized
practice of law and tort liability are most justified. Begg, supra note 4. See text ac
companying notes 25 & 34 supra.
88. To expect a pro se patron to ascertain and meaningfully compare alternative
sources of law library assistance is unrealistic. They are ill-suited to judge the com
parative qualifications of the library staff even if such infornlation were available.
89. DRAFT CODE, supra note 13, art. I, § 2.
90. Cf, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) ("the fundamental right of
access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation
and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law li
braries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law"). See also text ac
companying notes 49-65 sllpra.
91. At a minimum, these standards should include course work in legal bibliog
raphy, legal research technique, and a substantive course in legal process.
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If, at any Annual Convention of the American Association of Li
braries,92 a new Draft Code of Ethics is presented which warns
against the unauthorized practice of law, a clear definition of re
search assistance which constitutes such practice should be in
cluded. More specific guidelines should be adopted to aid law li
brarians and their staff to determine the proper extent of their
research efforts. These efforts need not be inhibited by legal doc
trines forbidding the unauthorized practice of law or imposing tort
liability for negligent acts. Further, immediate efforts must be
made to increase the general level of service available to pro se
patrons while viable long term solutions are developed. Law librar
ians should direct their efforts and use the considerable resources
of their libraries to design and implement programs that will meet
the needs of pro se litigants as a class. If this is done on a large scale,
law librarians may help to achieve a long term solution to the prob
lem of making pro se representation at least minimally adequate.
92.

See note 13 supra.

